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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1934, when he commented on medical malpractice in West
Virginia,' Hale J. Posten must have gazed into a crystal ball. He not-
ed:
As the practice of medicine in its various branches tends to become a
business rather than a personal relation, and the paternal position of the
family physician fades into the limbo of forgotten things, it is likely that
actions against doctors for their acts of negligence in the exercise of their
art will become more, rather than less, frequent.'
Indeed, the frequency, as well as the costs, of medical malpractice
litigation have risen markedly since the 1930s, particularly in the
1980s.' As a result, many physicians turned to the practice of "defen-
sive medicine" in order to avoid potentially costly malpractice law-
suits.' The consequences of defensive medicine are rising costs of
medical services for patients and rising malpractice insurance premiums
for physicians.' Recently, physicians, insurers, and lawyers have be-
come increasingly interested in the development of practice guidelines6
1. See Hale J. Posten, The Law of Medical Malpractice in West Virginia, 41 W. VA.
L.Q. 35 (1935).
2. Id
3. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUN'nNG OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: No AGREEMENT
ON THE PROBLEMS OF SOLUTIONS (1986); DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL LIABILrrY AND MALPRACTICE 3-6 (1987).
4. See J. E. Harris, Defensive Medicine It Costs, But Does it Work?, 257 JAMA
2801 (1987).
5. See S. Zuckerman, Medical Malpractice: Claims, Legal Costs, and the Practice of
Defensive Medicine, HEALTH AFF. 128 (Fall 1984).
6. This Note uses the term "practice guidelines" in place of many terms that are
presently used by other commentators that mean essentially the same thing. There are as
many terms used to describe practice guidelines as there are organizations interested in their
development. The American Medical Association, for example, uses the term 'practice pa-
rameters' because this term is
[Intended to encompass (I) standards, which are generally accepted principles for
patient management; (2) guidelines, which are recommendations for patient manage-
ment that may identify a particular management strategy or a range of strategies;
and (3) other patient management strategies such as practice options and practice
advisories. Other organizations and commentators use other terms, such as "practice
guidelines" [i.e., The U.S. General Accounting Office], or "practice policies" for
[Vol. 97:491
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- strategies that will assist physicians in clinical decision-making.7
Development of these guidelines will help physicians practice medicine
in a fashion that assures high quality and cost-effectiveness. 8
Increased interest in practice guidelines invites inquiry into the
effect of such guidelines on the legal side of medicine - medical mal-
practice litigation. Current standards in medical malpractice litigation
fail to provide either the plaintiff or the defendant with a clear under-
standing of the standard of care physicians owe to their patients.9 Fur-
thermore, the applicable liability standard in medical malpractice cases
must be proved by expert testimony.10 Each party hires one or more
experts who attempt to match wits on the stand. This "battle of the
experts" is not simply an imaginative creation in the minds of critics;
it is the reality of present medical malpractice litigation. Even in West
Virginia, the Supreme Court of Appeals has observed that:
[I]t is obvious that from the abundance of medical malpractice cases that
go to trial around the United States, and from the profusion of medical
experts advertising their services in the back of legal magazines, that many
doctors will gladly don their boxing gloves for a reasonable fee and testify
about malpractice matters."
This comparison of physician experts to fighters illustrates the per-
ception of medical malpractice trials even among experienced advocates
and judges. Arguably, a "battle of the experts" is not the way to con-
essentially the same concept ....
Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Practice Parameters be the Standard of Care in Malpractice
Litigation?, 266 JAMA 2886 (1991).
Generally, a "practice guideline" is defined as a "standardized specification for care
developed by a formal process that incorporates the best scientific evidence of effectiveness
with expert opinion." Lucian L. Leape, Practice Guidelines and Standards: An Overview, 16
QuALrrY Rnv. BULL. 42, 43 (1990).
7. Edward B. Hirshfeld, Practice Parameters and the Malpractice Liability of Physi-
cians, 263 JAMA 1556 (1990).
8. Robert H. Brook, Practice Guidelines and Practicing Medicine: Are They Compati-
ble?, 262 JAMA 3027-30 (1989).
9. For a discussion of the standard of care in medical malpractice litigation, see infra
Part II.
10. See Page Keeton, Medical Negligence - The Standard of Care, 10 TEX. TECH L.
REv. 351, 351-54 (1979).
11. Farley v. Meadows, 404 S.E.2d 537, 540 (W. Va. 1991).
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duct a negligence trial. A set of practice standards embodied in well-
established guidelines would, as this Note will propose, do away with
much of the need for these smooth-talking hired guns.
Furthermore, the implementation of practice guidelines as conclu-
sive pronouncements of appropriate standards of care in particular clini-
cal situations will increase the numbers of valid negligence claims
while decreasing claims that are frivolous. Some studies indicate that
too few valid malpractice claims 2 are actually filed.'3 For example,
the Harvard Medical Practice Study found that between 1975 and 1989,
seven to eight times as many patients suffered a treatment-related inju-
ry as filed a malpractice claim. 4 At the same time, neither negligence
nor injury was found in nearly eighty-five percent of malpractice
claims that were filed. 5 Thus, it appears that many claimants and
their lawyers do not understand the applicable standard of care in mal-
practice actions or whether the standard was met in their particular
case.'6 The lack of definitive standards of care, therefore, may also
account for the failure of legitimately injured patients to bring claims
against their physicians. 7
This Note does not endorse the use of practice guidelines in order
to decrease the amount of medical malpractice litigation. Indeed, as
evident from the Harvard Medical Practice Study, an increase rather
than a decrease in the number of viable malpractice claims is in or-
der.' However, practice guidelines will ensure that courts award dam-
ages to injured patients only where physicians fail to meet the applica-
ble standard of care.
12. A valid malpractice claim is one where an injury occurred as a result of a
physician's negligence, as opposed to no injury or no negligence.
13. See, e.g., 1976 CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL INSURANCE FEASI-
BILITY STUDY, SACRAMENTO, CA; 1990 HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL, HARVARD MEDICAL
PRACTICE STUDY: PATIENTS, LAWYERS AND DOCTORS, CAMBRIDGE, MA [hereinafter HAR-
VARD STUDY].
14. HARVARD STUDY, supra note 13.
15. Id.
16. Troyen A. Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: Collision or
Cohesion?, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 67, 69 (1991).
17. Id. at 69.
18. HARVARD STUDY, supra note 13.
[Vol. 97:491
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Practice guidelines, when properly developed,19 have the potential
to be highly influential in determining the standard of care applicable
to particular defendant physicians in medical malpractice lawsuits. In
order to understand the practical effect of practice guidelines in litiga-
tion, Part II of this Note provides a general overview of the tort of
negligence and the existing methodology for determining the standard
of care in medical malpractice litigation in general, and in West Vir-
ginia. Part III of this Note examines the history of practice guidelines
and the various theories underlying their development. Part IV of this
Note addresses the potential beneficial impact of practice guidelines on
the existing law of medical malpractice. Finally, Part V of this Note
proposes legislative action to adopt practice guidelines as conclusive
pronouncements of the standard of care for West Virginia physicians.
II. BACKGROUND
Medical malpractice cases are nothing other than more complicated
ordinary negligence cases. The plaintiffs elements of proof are the
same - duty or standard of care, breach, and resulting injury. The
primary difference between the two causes of action is the presentation
of evidence to establish the standard of care at trial. In conventional
negligence cases, testimony of a lay witness or the presentation of
other evidence establishes this element. However, in medical malprac-
tice cases, only the testimony of an expert witness establishes this most
important element of the case. A discussion of the general principles of
each cause of action follows.
A. The Standard of Care in Conventional Negligence Cases
Negligence is defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts as
"conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm."2 In order to
recover damages in negligence actions, the plaintiff must allege and
prove three separate elements: (1) injury to the plaintiff; (2) fault on
19. For a complete discussion on the formulation of guidelines, see inffra Part III.B.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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the part of the defendant; and (3) that the defendant's fault was the le-
gal cause of the injury to the plaintiff.2
To establish fault, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed
and breached a legal duty not to expose the plaintiff to a reasonably
foreseeable risk of injury.2 In conventional negligence actions, the
plaintiff establishes a defendant's breach of this duty by establishing
that the defendant did not meet the applicable standard of care. Today,
this standard of care may be established by statute, regulation, or prior
judicial decision.
In most circumstances, the defendant's conduct is measured by the
"reasonable person" standard. This standard measures the defendant's
conduct by comparing it to the conduct of a hypothetical reasonable
person in like or similar circumstancesY In typical negligence cases,
when the conduct in question is within the understanding of lay per-
sons, the jury is the ultimate judge of whether the defendant's conduct
was appropriate.26 Specifically, the jury decides whether the defendant
should have recognized the risk of his conduct,2 and in light of that
risk, whether the defendant's conduct was reasonable.28
Customs existing in various industries, as well as standards created
by organizations in those industries, are often used as evidence to es-
tablish the appropriate standard of care.29 The origin of the use of
customs dates back to the beginning of this century. In 1903, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes stated: "What usually is done may be evidence
of what ought to be done."3 However, courts must limit the use of
21. G. CHRISTIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 109 (1983).
22. Id.
23. RESTATEMtENT, supra note 20, § 285.
24. Id. § 283.
25. Id.
26. Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice
Litigation, 54-2 LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. 119, 126 (1991).
27. RESTATEmENT, supra note 20, §§ 289-90.
28. Id. at § 291.
29. See, e.g., Shafer v. H. B. Thomas Co., 146 A.2d 483, 485 (N.J. 1958); Pan Am.
Petroleum Corp. v. Like, 381 P.2d 70, 76 (Wyo. 1963). See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PRossER AND KEErON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 193-96 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEATON].
30. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903).
[Vol. 97:491
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customs in negligence cases because "[c]ourts must in the end say what
is required; there are precautions so imperative that even their universal
disregard will not excuse their omission."'" Thus, evidence of custom
is not an absolute determinant of the standard of care in a conventional
negligence case. In fact, some courts have found that following a cus-
tom may itself be found to be negligent. 2
Conventional negligence law imposes a duty of reasonable conduct
on the part of defendants. If this duty is breached and injury Jesuits,
the defendant is liable for that injury. Custom is one method of estab-
lishing the relevant duty of the defendant in a negligence case. As the
following discussion indicates, the role of custom plays a much more
important role in medical malpractice litigation.
B. The Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Cases
"Medical malpractice is the tort of negligence committed by physi-
cians and other health care professionals."33 Like traditional negligence
actions, the law charges the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action
with the burden of proof for each aforementioned element: injury,
fault, and causation. While the jury is able to determine the appropriate
standard of care on its own in conventional negligence cases, this task
is far more complicated in medical negligence cases.
1. Background
Stated generally, a physician's standard of care is that degree of
care and skill employed by qualified physicians in the same "school"
as the defendant physician.34 However, most states impose limitations
31. The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
32. See, e.g., The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, Eastern
Transp. Co. v. Northern Barge Corp., 287 U.S. 662 (1932); Dempsey v. Addison Crane Co.,
247 F. Supp. 584 (D. D.C. 1965). See also Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42
COLUM. L. REv. 1147, 1149, 1158 (1942).
33. Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn M. Wilder, Medical Standard Setting in the Current
Malpractice Environment: Problems and Possibilities, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421, 438
(1989).
34. PRossER & KEEON, supra note 29, § 32, at 187.
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regarding comparison of the defendant's conduct to the conduct of
other physicians. These limitations are based on either the defendant
physician's locality or, following the recent trend,35 the defendant
physician's field of specialization. 6
Until recently,17 physicians were bound to meet the standard of
care determined by other physicians in the same locality. 8 This "lo-
cality rule" often made it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to establish a
local standard because local doctors were unwilling to testify against
one another. 9 Without an expert familiar with the standard practice in
the community, it was impossible for plaintiffs to establish the local
standard of care. The potential for unjustifiable divergence in standards
of medical care based solely on geography, particularly given modem
access to technology in almost all communities, led most states to
rethink their strict approach to the locality rule.4"
As a result, strict interpretation of the locality rule in most states
has given way to a broader version of the rule. In most states, the
locality rule now states that a defendant physician is to be compared to
physicians practicing in the same or similar locality. At least one
court has even suggested that, because of modem communication and
transportation, all physicians should be held to a national standard of
35. The modem trend of most jurisdictions is to abandon the "strict locality rule" in
favor of a broader version of the rule. See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text. See
also Annotation, Modern Status of "Locality Rule" in Malpractice Actions Against Physician
Who Is Not a Specialist, 99 A.L.R. 3D 1133 (1980).
36. Annotation, Modern Status of "Locality Rule" in Malpractice Actions Against Phy-
sician Who is Not A Specialist, 99 A.L.R. 3D 1133 (1980) [hereinafter Modern Status].
37. By the middle of the century, most states had abandoned the "strict locality" rule
in favor of the modem "similar physician" rule. See Kinney & Wilder, supra note 33, at
441.
38. See PROSSE. & KEETON, supra note 29, § 32, at 188.
39. Kinney & Wilder, supra note 33, at 441.
40. See, e.g., Hundley v. Martinez, 158 S.E.2d 159, 166-67 (W. Va. 1967); Paintiff v.
City of Parkersburg, 345 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1986).
41. See Modern Status, supra note 36; Annotation, Malpractice Testimony: Competency
of Physician of Surgeon from One Locality to Testify, in Malpractice Case, As to Standard
of Care Required of Defendant Practicing in Another Locality, 37 A.L.R. 3D 420 (1971);
Annotation, Standard of Care Owed to Patient by Medical Specialist as Determined by Lo-
cal, "Like Community," State, National, or Other Standards, 18 A.L.R. 4TH 603 (1982)
[hereinafter Standard of Care].
[Vol. 97:491
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care.42 Almost all states have incorporated a national standard of care
for specialists.43 Nonetheless, no state has moved wholly to national
standards for all physicians.'
2. Establishing the Standard of Care
Because the standard of care in any given medical malpractice case
is based on the performance of physicians in the same industry, custom
plays a much greater role in medical malpractice litigation than in con-
ventional negligence. In medical malpractice litigation, "it is thought
that the jury lacks sufficient expertise to evaluate independently the
propriety of physicians' conduct. Therefore, jurors are instructed to
judge physicians not by the jury's sense of what is right, but by the
custom that prevails in the profession."46 The relevant custom is gen-
erally expressed in the form of an expert physician witness' opinion.47
Because physician testimony is necessary to establish the applicable
standard of care, medical expert testimony is virtually unavoidable
under the present system of medical negligence.
Proper jury understanding requires expert testimony because medi-
cine involves a body of knowledge beyond the understanding of the
42. See Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 349 A.2d 245, 248-52 (Md.
1975).
43. Standard of Care, supra note 41, at 614-20.
44. Id.
45. See Keeton, supra note 10, at 358.
46. Hall, supra note 26, at 126. See also Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required of
Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 605-09 (1959). But see, e.g., Helling v.
Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974). Helling is a well-known case finding a physician liable
despite showing compliance with an established custom. In Helling, the court ruled that the
defendant physician had followed the customary practice. However, the court held that com-
pliance with the customary practice alone did not guarantee exculpation of the defendant
physician. The Helling court concluded that the jury could find the defendant physician
negligent notwithstanding his compliance with the established custom. See also Toth v. Com-
munity Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y. 1968); Morgan v. Sheppard, 188 N.E.2d
808 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
47. See, e.g., Gilman v. Choi, 406 S.E.2d 200 (W. Va. 1990) (recognizing that, in
limited circumstances, application of the doctrine of res ipsa loqitur could avert the need for
expert testimony).
9
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average lay person.' Thus, only a physician, as an expert witness,
may testify as to the applicable standard of care and give an opinion
as to whether or not the defendant physician breached that standard.49
The plaintiff must present medical expert testimony at trial to establish
a prima facie case of negligence." As a practical matter, the defen-
dant physician is then forced to put on contrary expert testimony to
rebut the opposing expert's conclusions." The judge and jury play no
role in evaluating the defendant physician's conduct directly. Rather
their role is limited to evaluating the persuasiveness of the expert wit-
ness' testimony in light of all other evidence."
Generally, expert physician witnesses base their testimony on how
they would have conducted themselves or how they believe other phy-
sicians in the applicable comparison group would have conducted
themselves in the particular situation at issue." Such a basis for testi-
mony, however, is incorrect. 4 Consequently, the correct process of
comparing the defendant's conduct with established professional norms
degenerates into a contest of credentials between the opposing experts.
For instance, 'when the plaintiffs expert testifies that the defendant's
acts or omissions were not within the standards of the profession, she
is really saying only that she "would not have treated the patient that
way. 55
This exposition of the particular habits of testifying physicians is
exacerbated when there are no standards, recommendations, or guide-
lines published by medical specialty societies, physician groups, or the
like to guide the testifying physician.5 6 As a result, defendant physi-
cians are often held to a standard of care that reflects the "habit" of
the medical expert testifying. Some commentators have decried such
48. Hall, supra note 26, at 126.
49. See PROSSEL & KEETON, supra note 29, § 32.
50. Id.
51. Kinney & Wilder, supra note 33, at 440.
52. Keeton, supra note 10, at 351-54.
53. Hall, supra note 26, at 127.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Kinney & Wilder, supra note 33, at 442.
57. See Keeton, supra note 10, at 361-62.
[Vol. 97:491
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arbitrary standards."8 Accordingly, they have encouraged courts to
move toward standards based on what ought to be done rather than on
"customary" practice. 9
To combat the potential for a swearing match in medical negli-
gence cases, there has developed an "error of judgment" rule.0 Under
this doctrine, if two or more acceptable schools of thought exist on a
particular course of medical treatment, a physician is not negligent for
choosing one course over another." In theory, the error of judgment
rule permits a physician to exercise alternative treatment methods by
admitting evidence of an accepted course of treatment. 2
In practice, however, the error of judgment rule does little to rem-
edy the dilemma faced by juries who are forced to believe one expert's
opinion over another. Juries are still faced with the daunting task of
assessing the credibility of the representative experts. Thus, what began
as a trial against an allegedly negligent physician becomes a trial cen-
tered around two expert witnesses. If the physician can establish a
single appropriate standard of care in a particular instance and prove
compliance with that standard, the defendant physician should have an
affirmative defense to liability.63 An appropriate standard of care de-
fense should be rebuttable by the plaintiff only through evidence of
non-compliance with the accepted standard, rather than testimony as to
a different accepted standard.
C. Medical Malpractice In West Virginia
Before discussing the legal effects of practice guidelines generally,
it is necessary to put the law of medical malpractice in West Virginia
in perspective. After a brief comment on the background of West Vir-
58. Joseph H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession:
The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213, 1235-36 (1975).
59. Id.
60. Hall, supra note 26, at 128.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 127-29.
63. For further discussion of this notion, see infra Part IV.B.
11
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ginia medical malpractice law, this section reports on the current state
of the law.
1. History
Like most states, the standard of care for physicians in West Vir-
ginia was historically based on the existing standard of care in the
community - a "locality" standard." In the late nineteenth century,
the duty of a physician to a patient was "such reasonable, ordinary
care, skill and diligence as physicians and surgeons in the same neigh-
borhood, in the same general line of practice, ordinarily have and exer-
cise in like cases."65 The current locality rule was expressed in 1906
in Dye v. Corbin," where the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia held that:
[A] physician is not required to exercise the highest degree of skill and
diligence possible in the treatment of anr injury or disease[,] ... he is
only required to exercise such reasonable and ordinary skill and diligence
as are ordinarily possessed and exercised by the average of the members
of the profession in good standing, in similar localities and in the same
general line of practice, regard being had to the state of medical science at
the time.67
The traditional locality rule in West Virginia, however, has not
survived modem scrutiny. The Supreme Court of Appeals began to
chip away at the locality rule as early as 1967.68 Although the rule
was not completely abandoned, the court noted that the historical bases
for the rule were no longer applicable. Specifically, the court stated:
The locality rule came into being in the 19th century and was premised
upon the thought that is was unfair to hold the country doctor to the same
stringent standard as the supposedly more learned doctors practicing in
large urban centers . . . . [However, d]ue to highly improved modes of
transportation, most physicians have at their disposal adequate to excellent
hospital facilities. In addition, the now ready means of communication has
64. Id.
65. Lawson v. Conaway, 16 S.E. 564, 567 (W. Va. 1892).
66. 53 S.E. 147 (W. Va. 1906).
67. Id. at 149.
68. Hundley v. Martinez, 158 S.E.2d 159 (W. Va. 1967).
[Vol. 97:491
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permitted the doctor, regardless of his location, to keep abreast of recent
medical developments and practices . . In view of these obvious trans-
formations in today's society, the reasons for the strict application of the
"locality" rule have largely disappeared.69
Some form of the locality rule and its basic principles remained in
West Virginia up until 1986, when the rule was expressly abolished."
In Paintiff v. City of Parkersburg, the court found that:
[O]ur own prior cases have so eroded the rule that it is but a shadow of
its former self and that medical practice in West Virginia has changed to
such an extent that there is no longer any social policy to be served by
allowing a vestige of the rule to linger. Therefore, the locality rule in
West Virginia medical malpractice cases is abolished.7
Although the judiciary expressly abolished the, locality rule in West
Virginia, common law in the state still recognizes the "error of judg-
ment" rule.72 In West Virginia, the error of judgment rule states that
"[i]f a physician or surgeon, in a given case, adopts an established or
approved method of treatment and is not negligent or careless in the
application thereof, he is not liable, even for injuries caused by such
treatment.
73
2. The Medical Professional Liability Act of 1986
Soon after the abandonment of the locality rule in 1986 by judicial
decree,'74 the West Virginia Legislature passed the Medical Profession-
al Liability Act (the Act)." For a plaintiff to recover damages under
69. Id. at 166-67.
70. See Paintiff v. City of Parkersburg, 345 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1986).
71. Id. at 565.
72. See, e.g., Browning v. Hoffman, 103 S.E. 484 (W. Va. 1920); Maxwell v. Howell,
174 S.E. 553 (W. Va. 1934).
73. Browning, 103 S.E. at 487.
74. In fact, the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act was signed into law
only three months following the Supreme Court of Appeals' opinion in Paintiff v. City of
Parkersburg, 345 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1986). See Franklin D. Cleckley, A Free Market Anal-
ysis of the Effects of Medical Malpractice Damage Cap Statutes: Can We Afford to Live
with Inefficient Doctors?, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 11 (1991).
75. W. VA. CODE §§ 55-7B-1 to -11 (1994). The Act made sweeping changes in the
13
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the Act, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: "the health care provider
failed to exercise that degree of care, skill and learning required or ex-
pected of a reasonable, prudent health care provider in the profession
or class to which the health care provider belongs acting in the same
or similar circumstances."'76 The Act also requires expert testimony to
establish the applicable standard of care and whether or not the defen-
dant physician breached the applicable standard of care."
Because the current law ordinarily requires the plaintiff to present
expert testimony to establish a prima facie case of medical negli-
gence," the defendant generally must counter such testimony with an
expert of her own. What ensues is the often criticized "battle of ex-
perts."79 Moreover, because the jury must ultimately decide whether or
arena of medical malpractice litigation. In addition to the legislative abolishment of the lo-
cality rule, the act placed a cap of $1,000,000 on non-economic damages and prohibited a
stated dollar amount in any medical malpractice complaint. As this Note addresses only the
applicable standards of care for physicians, these other legislative achievements are beyond
the scope of this discussion. For a very thorough criticism of the Act, however, see
Cleckley, supra note 74.
76. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-3 (1994). Specifically, this section states:
The Following are necessary elements of proof that an injury or death resulted
from the failure of a health care provider to follow the accepted standard of care:
(a) The health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care, skill and learn-
ing required or expected of a reasonable, prudent health care provider in the pro-
fession or class to which the health care provider belongs acting in the same or
similar circumstances; and (b) Such failure was a proximate cause of the injury or
death.
Id.
77. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-7 (1994). Specifically, this section states:
The applicable standard of care and a defendant's failure to meet said standard, if
at issue, shall be established in medical professional liability cases by the plaintiff
by testimony of one or more knowledgeable, competent expert witnesses if required
by the court. Such expert testimony may only be admitted in evidence if the foun-
dation, therefor, is first laid establishing that: (a) the opinion is actually held by
the expert witness; (b) the opinion can be testified to with reasonable medical
probability; (c) such expert witness possesses professional knowledge and expertise
coupled with knowledge of the applicable standard of care to which his or her
expert opinion testimony is addressed; (d) such expert maintains a current license
to practice medicine in one of the states of the United States; and (e) such expert
is engaged or qualified in the same or substantially similar medical field as the
defendant health care provider.
Id.
78. See supra Part 1I.B.2.
79. See Gary W. Kuc, Comment, Practice Parameters as a Shield Against Physician
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not the defendant physician met the applicable standard of care, great
potential remains for a smooth-talking expert to mislead the jury."0
Thus, because the smoothest talkers will generally charge the most for
their services,"1 disregarding the issue of negligence or non-negligence,
the advantage lies in the party with the greater financial resources.
Indeed, the Act requires physician expert witness testimony be-
cause the relevant facts surrounding the case are generally far too tech-
nical and specialized for the unaided understanding of lay jurors.8 2
Extension of this premise leads one to the virtually unavoidable conclu-
sion that the jury bases its opinion solely on what it sees and hears
from the experts. It is this battle of the experts and great potential for
disparate treatment of physicians from case to case, that implementation
of practice guidelines would seek to avoid.
III. THE HISTORY OF PRACTICE GUIDELINES
After a brief background discussion of practice guidelines, this Part
focuses on the effect of the implementation of practice guidelines into
the existing system of medical malpractice litigation and opines that
such an implementation would benefit all parties unfortunate enough to
be involved in medical malpractice litigation.
A. Background
Late in the 1980s, practice guidelines emerged as a response by
the medical community to charges that the medical standard of care
was "highly variable, with no obvious explanation."83 Specifically,
critics argue that "because physician conduct is currently measured by
Liability, 10 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 439, 443 (1993).
80. "[J]uries are often poorly positioned to choose reliably between the well-argued,
but often highly confusing, theories of the two side's experts. As a result, they [the jurors]
often fall back on such irrelevancies as the witnesses' demeanor and style of presentation."
C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 778 (1988).
81. See Michael P. Ambrosio & Denis F. McLaughlin, The Use of Expert Witnesses in
Establishing Liability in Legal Malpractice Cases, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1351, 1394 (1988).
82. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
83. David M. Eddy, The Challenge, 263 JAMA 287, 287 (1990).
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the conduct of other members of the medical profession, whatever a
physician decides is, by definition, correct." 4 Establishment of uni-
form guidelines promises to curb this "internal" standard setting by
providing high quality, uniform, and predictable medical procedures
that will serve to measure appropriate conduct in a given clinical situa-
tion.
Practice guidelines, in one form or another, and for one purpose or
another, have existed for centuries. 5 Guidelines originated as theoreti-
cal pronouncements of proper medical procedures. 6 In the late 1980s,
guidelines shifted away from theoretical, passive expressions of clinical
decision making to active medical management tools.8 7 Moreover, the
practice guideline phenomenon promises to continue into the 1990s.8
B. Development
The most important issue that participants in medical malpractice
litigation must resolve in order to effectively implement practice guide-
lines is the promulgation of guidelines. Two theories have emerged on
the development of fair and acceptable practice guidelines - the pro-
fessional model and the political model. 9 While these two theories
endorse different authority for guideline development, both theories
share a common goal: the development and application of uniform,
predictable standards of care in particular clinical situations.
84. Id.
85. David M. Eddy, Practice Policies: Where Do They Come From?, 263 JAMA
1265, 1265 (1990).
86. See John D. Ayres, The Use and Abuse of Medical Practice Guidelines, 15 J.
LEGAL MED. 421, 421 (1994).
87. Kuc, supra note 79, at 446.
88. Anne-Marie Audet et al., Medical Practice Guidelines: Current Activities and Fu-
ture Directions, 113 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 709, 709 (1990).
89. See Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical Care: The Policy Ratio-
nale, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 777 (1990). Mr. Havighurst was found to be the foremost au-
thority on the theories of guideline development. His article, one of many he has authored
on the subject, was a great help and an extensive source of information for this Note.
[Vol. 97:491
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1. The Professional Model
As its name suggests, the professional model endorses the creation
of practice guidelines solely by the medical professionals most familiar
with the area of specialty in question.9" The ostensible rationale un-
derlying this notion is that physicians, as everyday practitioners and
scientists in particular specialties, are in the ideal position to develop
accurate and applicable standards.91 A fear expressed by some com-
mentators, however, is that endorsement of such a theory encourages
physicians to master their own malpractice destiny by setting their own
standards of care.92
Under the professional model, the law will evaluate the practices
of physicians only under professional norms and standards.93 This
model purports to best serve the patient by combining scientific knowl-
edge with an overarching dedication to patient welfare.94 The profes-
sional model also supports a high degree of physician autonomy. The
physician is an expert, is closest to the situation, and is, in most cases,
motivated by a concern for the individual patient's health.95
Foremost, the professional model endorses the notion that profes-
sional groups, especially the societies recognized in various specialties,
should develop and validate practice guidelines.96 Such development
and validation, according to the professional model, ensures that the
guidelines will represent a consensus within the profession.97 Addition-
ally, the professional model suggests that guidelines should not be
absolute standards, but flexible parameters tolerant of diversity
throughout the profession."
90. Id. at 785. See also, Clark C. Havighurst, The Professional Paradigm of Medical
Care: Obstacle to Decentralization, 30 JURIMETUCS 415 (1990); Clark C. Havighurst, Doc-
tors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional Relationships, 1984 DUKE L.J.
1071.
91. Havighurst, supra note 89, at 784.
92. Id. at 785.
93. Id. at 784-86.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Havighurst, supra note 89, at 785.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing Winslow & Nazarios, AMA, -Rand Go After Modern Ill: Unneeded Pro-
1995]
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Subscribers to the professional model find support for this model
in the fact that professionals are in a superior scientific position to
develop guidelines.99 Arguably, paramount to the efficacy of practice
guidelines is the scientific accuracy of the guidelines. Guidelines must
reflect sophisticated research concerning the outcomes and effectiveness
of certain courses of medical treatment.' 0 Therefore, the task of de-
veloping guidelines falls initially within the purview of medical scien-
tists. ' The practitioner then plays an important role in interpreting
and translating the highly technical research results into complete and
useful formulae of medical procedures.0 2
Physicians, as daily practitioners and researchers, are, indeed, an
important component of the practice guideline development process.
However, to allow physicians alone to establish acceptable practice
guidelines may provide them with too much control over their own
liability.0 3 Additionally, a single-sided development committee would
lack diverse interests which provide viewpoints not otherwise consid-
ered as well as a sense of impartiality in guideline creation. This Note
proposes that the following political model of development is the ap-
propriate method of developing practice guidelines.
2. The Political Model
The political model attempts to mitigate the potential of the pro-
fessional model to develop only physician-oriented practice guidelines
by including different members of the interested public in the devel-
opment process.0 4
If practice guidelines are not developed by members of the profes-
sional community, perception of the required conclusive effect of the
guidelines may be lost.' The developing committees of practice
cedures, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1990, at B 1).
99. Id at 786.
100. Id.
101. Havighurst, supra note 89, at 786.
102. Id.
103. See Hall, supra note 26, at 130.
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guidelines need not be comprised solely of medical practitioners to
receive authoritative professional status. If independent organizations,
representative of diverse community interests, including physicians,
base their standards on professional literature and practical experience,
the resulting guidelines should still have conclusive effect as a state-
ment of the standard of care."0 6 Although the political model is some-
times challenged as the means to a political end,'0 7 it is arguably the
most effective development system for practice guidelines.
The key element distinguishing the professional model from the
political model is the incorporation of non-medical interests in guide-
line development.0 8 Ideally, the inclusion of various non-medical in-
terests will result in guidelines that reflect concerns that a wholly pro-
fessional development team may ignore. 9 The incorporation of non-
medical concerns into practice guideline development provides an im-
portant advantage - credibility. "0
Opponents of the political model, particularly physicians, fear that
this model will impose static and inflexible standards."' Participation
by physicians and their colleagues in the creation of guidelines would
greatly abate this fear of inflexibility."' Indeed, because practice
guidelines ultimately dictate the quantity and quality of care given to
particular patients, the majority of the members of development organi-
zations are likely to be physicians. Thus, physicians would feel more
secure in guideline development and enforcement in the arena of medi-
cal malpractice litigation.
3. Conclusion
Although the professional and political models differ in several'
respects, both models share a common goal - the establishment of a
106. Id. at 130.
107. See generally Havighurst, supra note 89, at 786-88.
108. Id. at 787.
109. For example, the detrimental effects of medical malpractice on insurance
companies, local and national economics, and legal issues.
110. See generally Havighurst, supra note 89, at 786-88.
111. Id at 788.
112. See id. at 784-85.
509
19
McConkey: Simplifying the Law in Medical Malpractice: The Use of Practice G
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1995
WEST VIRGINIA LAWREVIEW
single set of standards to govern health care. "Under both models, the
raison d'etre of practice guidelines is simply to provide an improved
set of standards to which society - physicians, payors, courts, and
others - can look for authoritative guidance on the appropriateness of
treatment."
3
The notion that medical professionals are the only persons capable
of developing acceptable guidelines can be clearly supported by the
above reasoning. However, the threat of a system of guidelines geared
toward protecting the members of the medical profession, instead of
being concerned with the quality of care and standardization of medical
procedures, requires that a pure professional model not be adopted. The
guidelines purport to enhance the medical profession in ways other
than purely scientific - cost control, insurance issues, litigation, etc.
Therefore, there must be a method of checking and balancing the pro-
mulgation of guidelines through scrutiny in the form of committees of
specialists in the other areas of the guidelines' application - i.e.,
economists, politicians, and lawyers.'14
IV. EFFECT OF GUIDELINES ON EXISTING. LAW
If developed by competent, rational, and impartial committees,
practice guidelines will likely win legislative approval as appropriate
standards of care." 5 However, because the guidelines are evidence in
the form of written pronouncements of medical standards, the rules of
evidence govern their admissibility at a trial. Therefore, before analyz-
ing the potential effect of practice guidelines in medical malpractice
litigation, an understanding of the relevant rules of evidence that will
determine the admissibility of the guidelines is necessary. After dis-
cussing the rules of evidence, this Note will endorse the use of practice
guidelines to dictate the applicable standard of care in medical mal-
practice litigation. Finally, this Part will examine briefly the existing
113. Id. at 790.
114. Id. at 784.
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Maine Medical Liability Demonstration Project"6 as an example of
the practical effects of practice guidelines.
A. Evidentiary Obstacles
To be admitted into evidence at a trial, the proponent of the evi-
dence must prove the evidence to be relevant, reliable, and authen-
tic."7 Therefore, each of these criterion is discussed below.
1. Relevancy
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evi-
dence.... In order to show that a particular guideline is relevant, the
party seeking to introduce it must demonstrate that it addresses the
particular medical procedure at issue."9 The proponent of the particu-
lar practice guidelines at issue will most likely establish the relevance
of a particular guideline through medical expert testimony.2 ° Similar
to the present method of proving the standard of care in medical mal-
practice cases, expert testimony will be required to make any highly
technical issues clear to the jury.'2'
An important difference in the role of the expert in a case em-
ploying practice guidelines as opposed to the current system of medical
liability is that the expert will not testify, based on her own opinion,
about the standard of care. Rather, expert testimony is only required to
show that a particular pre-established standard is relevant to the case in
issue. One or more medical experts will likely clarify any clinical or
116. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-79 (West Supp. 1994).
117. See FED. R. EvID. 401, 801 & 901.
118. FED. R. Evw. 401.
119. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 16, at 75.
120. Most states require highly technical evidence, such as a practice guideline, to be
accompanied by expert testimony. This requirement ensures that the judge and jury will
understand the technical evidence and enables an informed decision regarding its relevance.
See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text
121. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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specialized facts necessary for clear understanding by the jury. The
technical aspects of medical malpractice litigation also require an ex-
pert or experts to explain whether a particular practice guideline has
been followed in the case. Thus, the expert's role in a trial involving
practice guidelines is only to aid the jury "in determining the factual
setting of the case.
2. Reliability
Once the offering party establishes that the particular practice
guideline is relevant to the circumstances at issue, that party must also
show that the practice guideline is admissible despite the evidence rule
against hearsay.122 The rule against hearsay is intended to exclude
certain unreliable evidence from the trial.' Both the West Virginia
and Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.' 24 To
be reliable, statements that are made out of court and are offered in
court to prove the truth of the matter asserted must find an exception
to the hearsay rule.'" Writings, such as medical practice guidelines,
are statements and must, therefore, pass a hearsay objection before they
will be admitted into evidence.126
The underlying purpose of the hearsay rule is to exclude certain
statements not made under oath or otherwise subject to punishment for
their falsity,127 unless other factors indicate reliability.' Legislatures
and courts have recognized many exceptions to the hearsay rule includ-
122. The guidelines at issue will almost universally qualify as out of court statements
offered for the truth of the matter asserted that must clear the hearsay hurdle to admissibil-
ity.
123. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 180-82 (2d
ed. 1987).
124. W. VA. R. EVID. 801(c); FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
125. FED. R. EVD. 801.
126. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)(1).
127. JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245, at 426 (4th ed.
1992).
128. See FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(5).
[Vol. 97:491
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ing the "learned treatises" exception1 29  and the "public records"
exception. 3 ° Unless practice guidelines receive the status of public re-
cords,"' the hearsay rule will be the critical barrier to their admissi-
bility.
Learned treatises are "statements contained in published treatises,
periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject . . established as a reliable au-
thority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert
testimony or by judicial notice."'32 Because these statements are sub-
ject to review by knowledgeable peers and the statements are generally
accepted by the particular community, courts generally consider learned
treatises more reliable than other types of statements.' Therefore,
learned treatises are generally admissible in court despite the hearsay
rule. Theoretically, practice guidelines could be admissible under this
exception to the hearsay rule. There are, however, limitations to the
learned treatise exception, discussed below, which largely eliminate the
exception's usefulness in medical malpractice litigation.
First, because expert testimony is generally required to establish
the reliability of a particular treatise,'34 the learned treatise exception
raises problems of witness credibility and battling experts.'35 For in-
stance, if one party opposes the introduction of a particular practice
guideline, that party must hire an expert to testify against admissibility.
Indeed, the primary reason for implementation of a system of practice
guidelines is the substantial elimination of expert testimony.'36 At the
very least, a practice guideline system will limit expert testimony to
factual and technical clarifications to the jury rather than testimony
about the standard of care in a given procedure.'37
129. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
130. FED. R. EVmD. 803(8).
131. Public records are defined as "[r]ecords, reports, statements, or data compilations,
in any form, of public offices or agencies . . . ." FED. R. EVID. 803(8). Unless the guide-
lines are promulgated by (or under the authority of) local, state or federal agencies, their
status as public records is unlikely.
132. FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
133. STRONG ET AL., supra note 127, § 321, at 533-35.
134. Id
135. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
136. See supra Part I.C.2.
137. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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Second, under the learned treatise exception, the proponent of the
treatise may only read the treatise into evidence and may not offer it
as an exhibit.' This limitation requires an expert to take the witness
stand to read the practice guidelines to the jury. Finally, only on cross-
examination may a party call a learned treatise to the witness' atten-
tion.'39 Thus, if a party relies on the learned treatise exception to ad-
mit practice guidelines, that party must do so through an adverse wit-
ness. In such a case, the proponent of the practice guideline cannot use
the practice guideline as part of its case in chief. This Note proposes
that the courts permit either party to use practice guidelines. Indeed, if
a party may only utilize practice guidelines through questioning of an
adverse witness, that party will not likely rely on practice guidelines to
formulate the applicable standard of care.
A more suitable exception to the hearsay rule for practice guide-
lines is the "public records" exception. 40 The public records excep-
tion is available only if the applicable practice guidelines are "records,
reports, statements, or data compilations in any form of a public office
or agency" made pursuant to a duty imposed by law.'4' A legislative
proposal implicating the use of practice guidelines may designate spe-
cial advisory committees or a public agency such as the West Virginia
Board of Medicine to formulate and approve practice guidelines.'
Therefore, practice guidelines are likely to be amenable to the public
records exception. Because the public records exception eliminates the
need for expert introduction of practice guidelines' and allows them
to be utilized as exhibits, "' this exception more effectively furthers
138. FED. R. EviD. 803(18).
139. Id.
140. FED. R. EVD. 803(8).
141. Id.
142. This Note proposes a legislative reform in medical malpractice litigation that close-
ly resembles Maine's "Medical Liability Demonstration Project" (the Maine Project). ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-79 (West Supp. 1994). Under the Maine Project, the
Board of Registration in Medicine is directed to review the practice policies that are devel-
oped by the Advisory Committees, to approve the practice policies that are appropriate for
each medical specialty area, and to adopt them as rules under the Maine Administrative
Procedure Act. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2973 (West Supp. 1994).
143. There is no requirement that public records be accompanied by expert testimony in
order to be admissible. See FED. R. EviD. 803(8).
144. Similarly, there is no limitation on the use of public records once they are admit-
[Vol. 97:491
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the desired objective of simplification of the medical malpractice litiga-
tion process.
3. Authenticity
The final evidentiary hurdle facing practice guidelines is authen-
ticity. Authenticity requires that the party offering evidence must dem-
onstrate that evidence to be what its proponent claims it to be.'45
Certain documents are "self-authenticating" and require no independent
authentication.'46 Public records under seal'47 or certified copies of
such records 4 ' are self-authenticating and, therefore, require no "ex-
trinsic evidence of authenticity."'49 Because practice guidelines are
likely to be public records under the proposed system of development
discussed previously, 5 ' such guidelines will have little difficulty
clearing the authenticity hurdle.
B. What Effect Practice Guidelines Should Have
"There is simply too much human variation to develop a predeter-
mined standard of care for every possible clinical problem a physician
might confront.'' However, the introduction of practice guidelines
would correct many of the shortcomings of the current system of medi-
cal malpractice law. Development of practice guidelines that are suffi-
ciently concrete to operate as clinical protocol is mandatory for this
objective. Otherwise, practice guidelines will have no more effect than
mere evidence of the standard of care.'52
ted into evidence. See FED. R. EviD. 803(8).
145. FED. R. EvID. 901(a).
146. FED. R. EviD. 902.
147. FED. R. EVID. 902(1).
148. FED. R. EviD. 902(4).
149. FED. R. EVID. 902.
150. See supra Part III.B.
151. Hirshfeld, supra note 7, at 1559.
152. Medical texts and journals, provided they escape the limitations of the hearsay
exclusion and are relevant, are used today simply as "evidence of the standard of care," but
are not absolute determinants of the applicable standard. Most states permit the introduction
into evidence of "learned treatises" as exceptions to the hearsay rule. See J. MCCORMICK,
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Practice guidelines should have the force and effect of law insofar
as they establish appropriate standards of care in particular cases of al-
leged medical negligence. Currently, practice guidelines may be intro-
duced into evidence in most states provided that they meet the afore-
mentioned evidentiary criteria.'53 Once admitted, however, a jury is
not obligated to apply the practice guideline as the standard of care.
Thus, under the current majority of state law, practice guidelines have
the same effect as any other learned treatise: a tool for expert witness-
es.
Under the system proposed by this Note, the introduction of prac-
tice guidelines should be permitted by either party. However, practice
guidelines should have conclusive effect only as an affirmative defense.
In other words, liability cannot result if the physician introduces an ac-
ceptable practice guideline with which she complied. According to the
well-settled "error of judgmeit" rule, even if the practice guideline in
question represents only one alternative method, so long as that method
is acceptable, the physician has met her duty of care.'54
Plaintiffs should also be permitted to introduce applicable practice
guidelines in medical malpractice litigation. However, the same conclu-
sive effect of the guidelines cannot be afforded to plaintiffs. By virtue
of the well established principle that several valid and acceptable
schools of thought may exist,'55 introduction of a single practice
guideline by the plaintiff coupled with proof of non-compliance cannot
be conclusive of a breach of the standard of care.'56 Unless a plaintiff
has the ability to introduce every practice guideline without exception
to show that the physician failed to comply with any established stan-
dard, the practice guidelines should have, for the plaintiff, only limited
evidentiary effect. Indeed, if a defendant physician could only rely on
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 321 (Cleary, 3d ed. 1984).
In most of these states, however, the rules of evidence require that a qualified expert
witness be called to read the medical text into evidence, and the text itself cannot be intro-
duced as an exhibit. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
153. See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Practice Parameters Be The Standard of Care in
Malpractice Litigation?, 266 JAMA 2886 (1991).
154. Hall, supra note 26, at 130.
155. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
156. Hall, supra note 26, at 130.
[Vol. 97:491
26
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol97/iss2/10
SIMPLIFYING THE LAW IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
one practice guideline, then there is no reason to limit its conclusive
effect to defendants only, for failure to comply would result in negli-
gence per se.
C. Maine Demonstration Project
Maine, in its Medical Liability Demonstration Project (the Pro-
ject),'57 is currently experimenting with the idea of giving conclusive
effect to practice guidelines. Under the Project:
In any claim for professional negligence against a physician . . partici-
pating in the project . . . in which a violation of the standard of care is
alleged, only the physician. . . may introduce into evidence, as an affir-
mative defense, the existence of the practice parameters . . . developed
and adopted pursuant to [the project] for that medical specialty area.'
Both the burden of establishing the appropriate guideline as well
as demonstrating compliance with that guideline rest with the defendant
physician. Once established, the plaintiff may introduce rebuttal evi-
dence to show non-compliance.5 9 Thus, once compliance with the
guideline is established by the defendant physician, the jury cannot find
the physician liable for medical negligence. Because only the defendant
physician may introduce the practice guidelines into evidence, the Pro-
ject has met with some disfavor by the plaintiffs' bar in Maine.16
Predictably, the medical community has largely endorsed the Project, as
it provides a great deal of protection for the medical participants.16'
The Project is currently without objective evaluation however, because
to date, no cases of alleged medical negligence have gone to trial un-
der the Project."'6
157. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-79 (West Supp. 1994).
158. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975 (West Supp. 1994).
159. Id.
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V. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL FOR WEST VIRGINIA
A legislative resolution would provide a possible remedy to current
problems of medical malpractice litigation by affirmatively declaring
what effect practice guidelines should have in medical malpractice
litigation.'" After a brief introduction, this Part will address the logic
behind a statutory initiative and then propose a statute for West Vir-
ginia.
Legislative proposals which have attempted to confer the force and
effect of law upon practice guidelines have fallen short of making
them predetermined standards of care in medical malpractice litiga-
tion.'" Because these attempts at statutory reform provide an unequal
benefit to the defendant physician,'65 unanimous support is impossi-
ble. Practice guideline proposals, such as the Maine Demonstration
Project, most frequently recommend practice guidelines for use by
physicians in defending malpractice claims.' The plaintiff may only
refer to the practice guidelines as evidence of non-compliance after the
defendant physician has introduced them.' 7 Some commentators be-
lieve that this result is political: "policymakers are concerned that phy-
sicians would resist the development and implementation of practice
[guidelines] if they became standards of care that a physician was obli-
gated to follow to avoid liability.' '1
8
A. Logic Behind Statutory Reform
The legislative proposal made by this Note is based in large part
on the Maine Project.6 9 However, recognizing some of the pitfalls
and criticisms of the Project, 7 ' and practice guidelines in general,
163. Hall, supra note 26, at 134.
164. Hirshfeld, supra note 153, at 2886.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. ME. R.V. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975 (West Supp. 1994).
168. Hirshfeld, supra note 153, at 2886.
169. See supra Part IV.C.
170. For example, the Maine statute permits only the defendant to introduce relevant
guidelines. Additionally, the dearth of guidance in the Maine statute as to practice guideline
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this Note has made subtle variations to the Maine Project in hopes of
resolving those shortcomings.
The costly effects of defensive medicine claimed to result from
rampant medical malpractice litigation"' would quickly evaporate
with blanket tort immunity for physicians who comply with accepted
practice guidelines.' Physicians could then practice "cookbook medi-
cine"'7 without fear of legal redress in the event of an unexpected
and unfortunate result. However, to have such an absolute effect in a
medical malpractice case, the guideline must be sufficiently narrow in
design and in the medical procedure at issue.74 Indeed, there exist
infinite possible outcomes, medical and otherwise, in any given clinical
setting. Thus, the design of a guideline narrow enough to dictate such
an absolute legal effect, would be difficult, if not impossible. 7
Therefore, even if a guideline establishes the applicable standard of
care, the arduous task of determining compliance by the physician re-
mains before the jury.'76
A possible solution is what has been termed a "variable immunity
statute."' 77 Under a variable immunity statute, in contrast to the
Maine Project, the now factual question of the standard of care, be-
comes a question of law for the judge.' The effect is to charge the
jury with the factual issue - determining compliance with the standard
of care by the defendant physician.
Under a variable immunity statute, the judge determines whether
or not a properly authoritative body promulgated the proffered practice
guideline.'79 The judge, who is not bound by rules of evidence, will
hear testimony from experts and other witnesses. The judge then makes
development gives courts little assistance when determining guideline validity. For a discus-
sion of the Maine Project, see supra Part IV.C.
171. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
172. Hall, supra note 26, at 134.
173. See Edward Felsenthal, Cookbook Care, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1993, at Al.





179. Hall, supra note 26, at 134-35.
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a determination of the appropriate standard of care based on that evi-
dence. 80 The judge will also be required to make the factual determi-
nation as to whether the particular practice guideline applies to the case
in issue."
The legislature should include some authoritative bodies whose
practice guidelines were qualified per se, and leave to the judge the
determination of other organizations' authority.' Again, in line with
the previous discussion of practice guideline development, it is impor-
tant that the developing authority should be comprised of not only
physicians, but other interested persons such as lawmakers, insurers,
and lawyers.' Thus, the judge would be somewhat limited by the
discretion of a qualified developing body, but would also be free to
make the determination based on a case by case analysis. 8 4 Most im-
portantly, however, the judge will be governed by precedent. As more
developing organizations are reviewed, a "list" of acceptable organi-
zations will begin to materialize. Thus, both defendants and plaintiffs
will be provided some guidance and predictability as to which organi-
zations will qualify.
B. Proposed Statute
The discussions to this point, for the most part, have criticized the
present system of physician liability. The following presents a statutory
initiative to adopt a system of practice guidelines in medical malprac-
tice litigation. The proposed statute is for use by the West Virginia
Legislature as a simple model for reform.' The applicable portion of
the statute would read:
Development of Practice Guidelines:
180. Id. at 135.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. For a discussion of proper entities to promulgate practice guidelines, see supra Part
III.B.
184. See Hall, supra note 26, at 135.
185. Because the scope of this Note is limited to narrow issues of liability and the
standards of care in medical malpractice litigation, provisions for insurance, court rules, and
other such considerations are knowingly omitted.
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Any organization purporting to issue practice guidelines determina-
tive of applicable standards of care within particular medical specialties
and in particular clinical situations must include, but not be limited to:
(1) One physician who is licensed in any state of the United
States;
(2) One physician involved in the active practice of medicine in
the particular medical specialty in question and is licensed to practice
medicine in that particular specialty by a state of the United States;
(3) One physician who is licensed to practice medicine in the
particular field of medicine in question in the State of West Virginia;
(4) One person, not a physician, representing the interests of
payors of medical costs; and
(5) One person, not a physician, who represents the interests of
consumers.
Content of Practice Guidelines:
The practice guidelines must define appropriate clinical indications
and methods of treatment within that specialty of medicine. The prac-
tice guidelines must be consistent with appropriate standards of care
and levels of quality. The practice guidelines must state, with reason-
able certainty, the standard of care to which a reasonable physician
practicing in the medical specialty in question, performing in the same
or similar circumstances, should be held.
Application of Practice Guidelines in Professional Negligence Claims:
(1) Introduction by the defendant. In any claim for professional
negligence against a physician who has, prior to the performing of the
particular services in question, elected to comply with the standard of
care as it is reflected in an accepted practice guideline, developed by a
qualified organization, the physician may introduce into evidence, as an
affirmative defense, the existence bf the accepted practice guideline
with which the physician allegedly complied.
(2) Introduction by the Plaintiff. In any claim for professional
negligence against a physician who has, prior to performing the partic-
ular services in question, elected to comply with the standard of care
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as it is reflected in an accepted practice guideline, developed by a
qualified organization, the plaintiff may introduce into evidence, as evi-
dence of the standard of care, the existence of the accepted practice
guideline with which the physician allegedly did not comply.
(3) Burden of Proof. Any physician who pleads compliance with
an accepted practice guideline as an affirmative defense to a claim of
medical professional negligence has the burden of proving that the
physician's conduct was consistent with the practice guidelines in order
to rely upon the affirmative defense as the basis for a determination
that the physician's conduct did not constitute medical professional
negligence. If the plaintiff introduces into evidence an accepted practice
guideline, the plaintiff will have the burden of proving that the
physician's conduct did not comply with the particular accepted guide-
line in question in order to raise a rebuttable presumption that the
physician did not meet the applicable standard of care and is, therefore,
liable for medical professional negligence.
(4) No change in Burden of Proof. Nothing in this chapter alters
the burdens of proof in medical professional negligence proceedings
existing as of adoption of this legislation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether or not physicians and other critics correctly perceive the
efficacy of the current model for physician liability, the effects of this
perception cannot be doubted. Medical practitioners are practicing de-
fensive medicine, paying exorbitant malpractice liability insurance pre-
miums, and blaming it on the perceived shortcomings of the current
system of medical malpractice litigation. By legislatively implementing
practice guidelines as clear standards of care in medical negligence
litigation, health care providers could rest assured that conformance
with an established practice would protect them from liability. The
existence of clear pronouncements of standards of care is currently
presumed in medical malpractice litigation. This presumption is reflect-
ed by the fact that custom, presented by expert witnesses, plays such a
vital role in malpractice litigation. However, this vital aspect of mal-
practice litigation assumes that which does not exist - established
standards of care for physicians.
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Functional equivalents of practice guidelines exist in medical jour-
nals and treatises and they are applied everyday in the practice of
medicine. Use of these guidelines as effective defenses in medical mal-
practice cases would encourage their use by physicians. The results
would be predictable standards and procedures which would provide
physicians with clear and uniform standards of care. Physicians would
practice less defensive medicine because defensive medicine would be
legally obsolete.
Sam A. McConkey, IV
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